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Data Protection -Transport
ROAD TOLLING AND PRIVACY
SOME COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE EC DIRECTIVE ON DATA PROTECTION1
Jean-François Lerouge
INTRODUCTION Commission dearly insists on the tact that any decision regard-
ing tolling systems should be adopted in conformity with the
genernl prindple of the information technology and the EC
Directive on the Protection of individuals witb ~ard ta the
processing of personal data and on the /Tf!e mOllement of
sucb data. 7There are many projects already tested. It is impos-
sible to analyse each of them in spire of their evident interest.8
ln this contribution, it is proposed to examine three different,
already tested, EU projects, and to see how an automatic tolling
system could be used in conformity with the directive and
whether or not such directive offers suffident protection of
the individual. It will highlight the necessity to adopt common
legïslation and will make recommendations for ilS adoption.
PRESENTATION OF THE PROJECTS
ANALYSED
Nowadays almost ail European countries are confronted with
the problem of trnffic congestion. Many consortia are devoted
to suCh a subject and many solutions are put forward in orner
to try to improve mobility inside European countries. One of
the recurrent solutions is to require the user to paf for using
the road. The tolling solution is considered as a great help for
the purpose of curbing the demand and should encourage
people to use public transport.
Some Member States have adopted a tolling system for a
long time. Others, suffi as England,2 intend to instaIl one. There
are different possibilities to organize the tolling on the roads. It
is, however, very important that traffic flot slow down due to
payment requirements. Therefore, the actual objective of many
countries consists in promoting an automatic system designed
to avoid traffic congestion where users have to paf.
It is recommended that any new system should comply with
basic requirements. So, for example, any system may; in the
future, have to comply with some European requirements estab-
lished by forthcomïng legislation on tarification.3 An automatic
tolling system should also use common technical features to
pernlit the driver to use the same system in any country, in
orner to fucilitate better mobility inside Europe and avoid new
obstacles to fluid traffic within Europe. It also needs particular
measures to warrnnt that payment bas occurred (contlâctual
objective), to pursue fraud and to pernlit the debt recovery
(repressing objective).All this will probably induce the opera-
tors to use technical systems (generdJly a flash of the registlâ-
tion plate),4 to identify the driver althoUgh a good distance
opening barrier may already be satisfuctory to avoid fraud.
Regarding the above requirements, many projects of auto-
matic tolling have already been experimented upon.5 Each of
them Tenders possible the collection of numerous data that
will probably be exchanged between European countries
(date, place, time and amount of payment, number of kilome-
ters realized, when, on what road...). Suffi data will not Only
serve to demonstlâte payment (contractual use) but could also
be used for statistical purposes, controlling the traffic and
detecting infraction to the highway code (policy use), or the
monitoring of an employee by an employer or a wife by a jeal-
ous husband, etc. Fortunately, in ils Communication,6 the~
The Mans Project
The Mans project is a project initiated by the four Nordic
countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). On the
basis of their experiences, they have established common
guidelines and recommendations on interoperable road user
tee collection to be implemented in each of the countries'
national legislation. This means that the guidelines, enabling
interoperabiIity, will be included in the legai concessions
which regulate how the toll road operators should design
their payment systems.
One of the preliminary recommendations on interopera-
ble road user charging during the experimentation period
of such project, was to maintain the possibility 9f-adeferred
payment as a main payment option and/or as a way of
exception handling. ln the context of this analysis, we will
hereafter associate the Mans project with the idea of
deferred payment.9
project Based on the use of Smart Card
Many projects are based on the use of the sman caro. One
example isAdept Il.Adept Il is an EU 4th fi"dmework project.
Here the technology involved the use of smart cards and
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microwave-based transponders. ln this project, the electronic
chip of the smart caro contained a transport purse, a link to a
central account, public transport pass and a log file.
For the purpose of this analysis, when referring to Adept
Il, we will consider,as an alternative, the hypothesis of the use
of a smart caro without a link to a central account even
thOUgh this was not the purpose of the Adept fi project.
with regard to the directive, this does not necessarily mean
that the same conclusions can be drawn with regard to
nationallegislation.As fac as possible we will attempt to draw
the attention of the leader whenever a different interpreta-
tion may be possible between the legislation of Member
States.
The first section will be devoted to an identification of the
personal data that may be collected with the automatic
tolling solution. We will also briefiy have a closer look at the
notion of "processing of persona! data". Secondly, we will
identify the "controller(s)". Finally, we will identify the obliga-
tions that the controller must respect. We will sec that some
of them are problematic with regard to what we are dealing
with.
Technology for Automatic Account
Identification
Another technology bas aJso been tested: the Tecbn%gy .for
Automatic Account Identification.
A payment system based on Automatic Account
Identification (AAI) is built on radio communication between
in-vehicle equipment and roadside mounted equipment. The
basic principle is that the vehicle communicates a string of
information to the roadside equipment. The strings identify
an account where the fee will be debited for future invoicing.
This account is stored in a central computer system, which is
updated at fIXed interva1s. One could go further and imagine
the same system but with satellite technology locating the
vehicle instead of roadside equipment.lO The reader is now
familiarized with the projects that will serve as a basis for this
analysis. The nat point will be devoted to the legai ruies
which appiy in the field of data protection and privacy and to
the problems that may occur regarding the tolling systems as
presented.
Personal data collected and their
processing
Following article 2a, Persona! data sha11 mean: "any informa-
tion relating to an identified or identifiable natw-d.1 person
('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified direCtly or indirectly, in particuIar by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to
their physica!, physiological, mental, economic, cultw-d.1 or
social identity". Article 2b of the directive off ers a definition
of the processing of persona! data: "Processing of personal
data sball mean any operation or set of operations wbicb is
perjormed upon persona[ data, wbetber or not Dy auto-
matic means, sucb as collection, recording, organization,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrievat; consultation,
use disclosure Dy transmission, dissemination or otberwise
making available, alignment, combination, b/Qcking, era-
sure or destruction.»
Those defmitions adopted are very broad. The Iatest one
seems aIl-encompassing. By reading those articles, some con-
clusions may already be drawn. Let us first poirit out that the
notion of information is not defined. ln application of the
Directive (it may be different for some member states), it is
not necessary that the information should compiy with some
particuIar formality.A written, coded piece of information or
one present in a sound or a picture makes persona! data.14
Following this, in case of automatic tolling systems, the fol-
lowing persona! data may be considered as potentia1ly
processed:
ROAD TOLLING AND THE EC DIRECTIVE
ON DATA PROTECTION
The European Directive on the protection of individuals with
n:gard to the processing of personaJ data and of the free move-
ment of suffi data was adopted on 24 October 1995. The tex!
Jays down a number of principles with regard to the proteCtion
of fundamental rights and freedom of naturnl persons and, in
particular, their right to privacy with n:spect to the processing
of personal data. The Directive pursued a duaJ objective: engur-
ing the free flow of personal data within the Union whilst at
the same time establishing common rules safeguarding the fun-
damental rights and freedom of individuals.ll The member
states were req1Ùred to transpose these principles into their
national legislation before 24 October 1998.
It is not the aim here to analyse each nationallaw12 for the
pwpose of seeing if the decision to install an automatic
tolling system would compiy with data protection legislation.
The Directive offers common criteria for suffi analysis. Dy
studying the Directive,one would like to see whetherthe cur-
rent European legislation a1lows suffi installation and on
what conditions. One should aIso try to determine which sys-
tem seems most responsive to privacy and data protection
criteria. FinaIly, we will see if there is any need for new EC leg-
islation for the use of such systems. Prudence is, however, rec.
ommended in the interpretation of the conclusions we may
draw. As Prof essor PouIIet points out,13 Recital 9 of thc
Directive highlights the importance of the "margin of
manoeuvrnbility" enjoyed by the Member States. ln addition
to this then: is the traditional margin of interpretation of the
wording. Therefore for any conclusions that may be drawn
1. Data collected a priori
Some data MaY be collected on the subscription agreement
any,for example when a toll badge is granted.15
2. Data generated or created through the use of the
telematic system
By the use of the system, a number of data may be collected
suffi as:
.the registration number plates in case a flash of the regis-
tration plate is used (whatever the purpose, ego proof or
repressing of fl-aud);
.the date, place, time and amount of the payment;





























.in another context, the registration plate office. Indeed, as
has already been explained, in the case of automatic
tolling systems, many operntors will flash the registration
plate for the purpose of avoiding mud or simply to con-
serve proof of the driver's passage in the case of any pay-
ment dispute.23 The operntors will be interested in
identifying the link between the persan and his/her regis-
tration plate. To establish suffi a link they will seek infor-
mation from the registration plate office. Therefore, if the
latter communicates suffi information to the operators, it
will be for another purpose than one purely relating to
the prosecution of criminal offences or tax collection.
This reminds one that the legitimacy of such communica-
tion by a public authority should be examined with
regard to the Recommendation noR (91) 10 of the Comite
of Ministers24 article 7 e and f of the Directive25 and there-
fore be foreseen by Iaw.26
Some of those actors (ie. the bank on the registration
office...) may already be considered as controller for other
specific purposes. They may individually be considered as
Controller depending on the role they might play in the
determination of the purposes and means of the processing
of persona! data. ln addition, some actors, suffi as the bank,
could be interested in creating a shared system of informa-
tion and, with the operator jointly considered as Controller.1n
fact, the system in place may be quite complex linking both
controller and processor?7
To have the same controller opernting in all European
countries, no other possibility seems to exist than imposing,
by DireL'tive, the same actors.28
The controller's obligations
Hereafter we will identify the most relevant obligations that
the controller has to compiy with, with regard to the collec-












A problem may accur when a car, registered in the name of
a legal entity is flashed when crossing the toIling place or
when an employee pays with a card of a company in applica-
tion of the technical system of Adept Il or when the payment
system is based on Automatic Account Identification (AAl).
According to the Directive, legal persans are outside ils scope
of application. However:"if data related to a natural person (e.g.
the name of a director of a company) is present amongst infor-
mation related to a legal persan, then the directive applies."16
ln spede, the question is to know whether or not the persan is
identifiable according to the registration number of the com-
pany's plate or the transaction realized by the reIoaded smart
card or in application of the AAl technology (is the account
where the Cee will be debited for future invoidng, in the
employee's name?). The application of the directive will in fact
depend on the interpretation of the criteria used to determine
if the persan is"identifiable".The Directive states that" an iden-
tifiable natural persan is one who can be identified directiy or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification num-
ber or to one or more factors...". Following recital §26 of the
Directive for detennining whether a persan is, or is not, identi-
fiable, account should be taken of ail the means which might
reasonabiy be used by the controller, or by any other persan to
identify suffi a person.17 The identifiable character appears
here to be taken into consideration with regard to the possibil-
ities of the identification the controller( s) may have. 18 Here, we
may thus be faced with data we may consider as anonymous
regarding the physical persan because it may require an exces-
sive effort in terms of people, lime and money to associate the
data with a natural persan. Therefore, on the question of know-
ing whether or not the Directive will appiy when the data col-
lected corresponds to the data relating to legal entity, one
should assess whether or not the factuaI circumstances sur-
rounding the identification of the individual requires an unrea-
sonable amount of effort on the controller's part.According to
this view, it is on the controller's Iiability to prove trot a datum
is not identifiable.19 One should know, however, trot some
member states do not agree with this view.20
This issue may appear quite theoretical but in reaIity it
seems important to point out trot in the example, legal per-
sons will not necessarily fall outside the scope of application
of the Directive. This should avoid the creation of a specific
" system Only for business use.21
lente
1. To obtain the consent of data subject or process-
ing necessary for a specific purpose
According to article 7 of the Directive, Member States
shall provide tbat personai data may be processed
only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his
consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party or in
order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract,'or (.,.)
(c) (..,)
(d) (..,)
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a
task carried out in the public interest or in the exer-
cise of officiai authority vested in the controller or in
a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the pU11Joses of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controUer or by
the tbird party or parties to whom the data are dis-
closed, except where such interests are overridden by





According to article 2 d of the directive, the controUer is the
natural or legal perron who aIone or jointIf with others,
determines the purposes and means of the processing ofper-
sonal data. When the purposes and means are defined by iaws
or reguiations, the controUer may be designated by such iaw.
ln application of the definition, one MaY identify different
persons for the tolling system who will be considered as
ControUer:
.the operators as regards the processing of the data con-
cerning the use of the road;
.the bank, when there is a link between the smart caro and
a central account (for example in the project Adept Il in
the case of reloaded caro22 or foUowing the technicalAAl)
with regard to the payment infonnation and the infonna-
tion generated by the payment;
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the data subject which require protection under
Article J.
ln what follows, each of the conditions that have been
identified as relevant for this case will be analysed. The choice
of one criterion instead of another will depend on the fortnS
of relations between the public entities, the owners of the
networks and infrastructure on the one band and technologi-
cal operators on the other.
specie, it is difficult to imagine any other possibility to
inform the driver than give him the relevant infonnation
when he concludes the contract with the operators,35 or
at the time the driver receives bis tolIing card or bis
transponder. Moreover, the contract should necessarily
contain infonnation about the identity of the controller in
ail European countries, and the right of access of the data
subject.36 A piece of infonnation given by a board placed
along the road seems largely inappropriate since it is
given after the implicit consent of the driver.
It is clear that there may be problems with regard to the
data subject's consent. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that the controllerwill not be authorized to collect and
process personal data. Article 7 provides alternatives to the
obligation of obtaining the consent of the data subject.
b) A processing necessary for the performance of a
task carried out in the public interest or in the
exercise of officiai authority vested in the control/er
The ternI 'public interest' varies among Member States.
SimiIarly the expression 'exercise of an officiai authority' is dif-
ficult to detine in the abstracto Whether or not the activity is
carried out in the exercise of an officiai authority will depend
on the circumstances of the case. With regard to this, it may
depend on the link existing between the public authority and
the operators; in short in identifying the actors involved in the
tolling road project and the context of their intervention
(request of the public authority, margin of manoeuvre.. .).
Recital 58 of the Directive, which gives examples of public
interest in the cases of international transfers of data between
tax or customs administrations, is not clear enough for draw-
ing firm conclusions. If one looks at the European case law,it is
interesting to point out that part of public interest objective is
to realize an optitnal road network?7 One must, however,
draw the attention of the reader to the fact that the notion of
an optimal road network is rather broad and that a consensus
on such a notion may be difficult to obtain. But, in the present
case, as already explained, European countries are notably try-
ing to encourage mobility,38 to avoid traffic congestion and
reinforce security on the roads. 1t is notorious that they look
for the best service to offer to the user in the best economical
circumstances. The European Union thinks that rr may play a
significant role in achieving such a purpose.39 It cannot be
denied that all of this seerns relevant to the public interest.
Therefore, it is submitted that, if the system is organized as a
result of the adoption of a specific law (and not by a decision
of a European consortium of private operators),40 the data
processing could be based on such provision. Such a law
should be common to all European member states which
seems unavoidable since article 14 foresees a right of objec-
tion from the data subject otherwise provided by nationalleg-
islation.41 The law Will, however, still have to fulfil the
criterium of legititnate purpose.42
a) The Data subject's consent
The data subject's consent is defmed as any freely given spe-
cific and informed indication of bis wishes by wbich the data
subject signifies bis agreement to persona! data relating to
him being processed.29
Each element of the definition will now be considered
and the practical effects explained:
.any given indication of bis wishes
The form of the consent is flot important. The consent may
be written or oral. It may be general (except in application
of the exception provided by the Directive3~ or implicit,
i.e. in this case, the consent may be deduced by the use of
the road. One could indeed consider that the driver, by
using the road and the automatic tolling system, bas implic-
itly agreed that its data be processed by the OpeI"ators.
.a freely given consent
The data subject's consent must flot be given under p~
sure (wbich may be particularly difficult when an employ-
ee uses a company car). It notably impües that there are
no consequences of discrimination if the consent is not
obtained. Although one must recognize that compliance
with suffi a condition is difficult to verity, wbich therefore
renders it theoretical,31 one should also point out the
importance and the difficulty of respecting suffi a condi-
tion in the case of automatic tolling systenlS. Therefore, for
economic reasons, there is concern that some Member
States, not yet having any tolling systenlS may decide to
instal1 only an automatic one, wbich could offer the driver
no other alternative than acceptance of the processing of
his/her persona! data. 32 ln this case, one may consider that
his/her consent bas not been given freely, that no process-
ing is thus authorized and therefore that suffi an automat-
ic tolling system is not allowed.
.a specific consent
The data subject's consent must relate to a particular pur-
pose. The consent must relate to a well-defined and legiti-
mate purpose. Use of vague or generic finalities must
therefore be avoided.33 ln other words, the data subject
must kn<;>w exaCtly what is the extent of bis given con-
sent. ln specie, the data should Only be collected for the
purpose of permitting the payment and the billing if any,
and eventually the traffic management.Any broader given
consent should flOt be taken into consideration.
.an informed consent
The consent of the data subject must be informed. ln
other words, the data subject must be made aware of the
risks and advantages of the processing and must be
informed of his rights before consenting to the processing
of his data or the conclusion of a contract that may
involve a necessary processing of data. This implies that
the controller must inform the data subject of these.34 ln
c) A pracessing necessary for the legitimate
interests pursued by the cantraller or by the third
party ar parties ta wham the data are disclased
Article 7f states that persona! data may also be processed if











a) Description of the case
ln 1996, the Société des autoroutes Bas-Rhin (SAPR) brought
a particulariy interesting me before the CNIL.50 The SAPR
wanted to experiment with an automatic reading plate sys-
tem for vehicles moving on its AutoRoute. ln such systems,
the "tl"dffic captors" permit the identification of a vehide in a
traffic flow. Data so collected have to be retained for a month
in an iildirectJy nominative form, then made anonymous for
statistical reasons. The CNIL, basing its reasoning on Article 8
of the Convention,judged that such a project,founded on the
identification of ail vehicles using a motorway network at a
given tlme, attacked privacy and the fundamental right of per-
sons to move anonymously. The CNIL also insisted on the lim-
ited rule of the operators ruling that they were DOt in charge
of policy development. The latest point is interesting given
the tact that in another case,SI the CNIL accepted the reading
and processing of registration plates by custotns officers.S2
This begs the question of whether or not a flash of the regis-
tration plate made for the purpose of controlling fraud when
crossing the tolling place should be considered, as the French









































inten:sts pursued by the controller or by the third party or
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such
interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require pro-
tection under article 1.
Recital 30 of the Directive provides help for the under-
standing of this article that seems very broad and a danger
for a person who would like to avoid the necessity to
obtain the consent of the data subject. Following recital 30:
"tn order to be lawful, the processtng of personal data
must be necessary c...) for the legtttmate tnterests of a
natural person, provtded tbat the tnterests or the rtgbts of
freedoms of the data subject are not overridtng; (...)
Member States may stmtlarly spectfy the conditions
under wbtcb personal data may be dtsclosed to a tbtrd
party for the purposes of marketing wbetber carried out
commerctally or by a charitable organtzatton or by any
otber organtzatton or foundatton, of a poltttcal nature
for example, subject to the provisions allowtng a data
subject to object to the processtng of data regardtng btm,
at no cost and wttbout bavtng to state bis reasons.N The
philosophy of this recital (notably, the data subject's right
of objection)43 promotes us to think a priori that it is not
useful as a basis for a right of processing. The analysis in the
following section of the criterium of legitimacy will con-
firm this.
Following this, a first conclusion may aiready be drnwn:
according to article 7 of the Directive, the right to process
personal data seems finally to be conditioned by the adoption
of a law on the basis of public interest.
2. Collect data for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes
Persona! data must be collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes.44 Moreaver, persona! data
must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to
the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed.45 It is a matter of Iimiting a priori the scope of
infringement to privacy by fixing the borders of the con-
troller's action. The specified purpose should also permit the
control of processing's legitimacy and the pertinence of the
data by the control authority.46The legitimacy of the purpose
is easily understandable: individualliberty and rights may not
be violated without any justification. The purpose of the pro-
cessing should therefore be useful and necessary with regard
to the corporate purpose of the company or its general inter-
est. The criterium of legitimacy is also used inArticle Sb of the
Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individu-
ais with regard to the automatic processing of persona!
data.47
Further help for interpretation may be found in article 8§2
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights48 and
in the case Iaw of the European Court of Human Rights.
According to the latter this is oniy acceptable as an attack on
privacy if the attack is sufficient and pertinent.49 Let us see by
a concrete example taken from French case law of the CNIL,
(the French authority in charge of privacy control) what are




b) Analysis of Article 8
Article 8 states that"'everyone bas the rlgbt to respect for bis
prlvate and family life, bis home and bis correspondence.
There sba// be no interference by a public autborlty with
the exerctse of tbis rlgbt except sucb as is in accordanœ
witb the Law and is necessary in a democrattc society in
the interests of national securlty, public safety or the eco-
nomic weO-betng of the country, for the prevention of disor-
der or crime, for the protection for bea/tb or moraL\", or ji:Jr
the protection of rlgbts and freedom of otbers,n
TlùsArticle nises the following question:what might hap-
pen in the case of interference made by a private person or
company (i,e. a private tolling operator) since this Article
seems only to cefer to public authorlty. If Pettiti53 is correct
ceferring to the A.c, Franœ case,54 it seems that the interfer-
ence must necessarily be made by the State, in the person of
its organ or its agent acting officially.According to this view, a
private operator does not enter the scope of Article 8, The
SaIne conclusion cannot be drawn if one follows the position
of van Dijk and van Hoof. For those who base their opinion
on case law:"the second paragraph of Article 8 expressiy men-
tions "interference by a public authority", It might be inferred
from this that the whole article refers oniy to acts by the
authorities. However, the interpretation equaIly appears ten-
able that the first paragraph generally prohibits interference
with privacy and the second paragraph permits such tnterfer-
ence on particular grounds and exclusively by the public
authorities, (" ,) The article could be invoked before the
national courts against a private individual in those system in
which the Convention bas internaI effect. Moreover, article 8
then would impiy the obligation for the contracting States to
assure respect for privacy by individuals to the best of their
ability via the legislature, the administration, and the
Courts."55




related to the individual right of mobility.63 Therefore, it sug-
gests a preference for projects such as die Mans project
(deferred payment) or experimented upon by the Adept fi
project which assumes that the smart card will not be
reloaded. With regard to MI technology, one can ask whether
the string of information necessarily bas to identify an
account number. It would seem that a simple piece of infor-
mation communicated to a bank would perhaps best compiy
with the proportionality princip le. Finally, it might be suggest-
ed that the road user be given a choice to maintain alternative
payment facilities so that he can select whatever form he
wants (e.g. a more anonymous method of payment. However,
by accepting that he will not receive a proof of paymen~ or
deferred payment which is less respectful of privacy aIbeit
with a better possibility of control...).65
Such projects should in any way be organized by a law
that answers the following criterium: the purpose of the pro-
cessing imposed by law should be pertinent, suffident and
accompanied by warranties. Moreover, the law should state
expressiy that the purpose of the processing must at any time
compiy with the purpose it describes and may not be
changed.
Article 8 lays down three conditions for an interference to
be considered as legitimate:
First, the interference must be made in accordance with
the law. It is commonly believed that the term "law" must be
interpreted broadly and as covering flot only written law but
also unwritten law.56 The law must, however, be equally
accessible and foreseeable. This means that the law must be
easily accessible, often through published sources like Court
decisions, text books and other publications.57 The foresee-
ability requirement implies that:"a norm cannot be regarded
as 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate bis conduct: he must be able -
if need be with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences
which a given action may entail."58 ln the case broUght before
the CND.., there was no law that could justify the experiment
of the SAPR at the exception of Article 7 c of Directive
93/89/CEE of 25 October 199359 which imposes upon
Member States a duty to collect the payment at the toll in a
way that best avoids trdffic congestion. Such an article is,
however, too broad to enable dtizens to regulate their con-
duct. Therefore, the decision of the CNIL seems easily under-
standable and justified: without law, there should be no
interference to privacy whatever the quality (private or pub-
lic) of the party and, in consequence no flash of the registta-
tion plate for ensuring a good perception at the tol1ing.
The two other conditions60 mentioned inArticle 8,for the
purpose of legitimating an interference, do flot need to be
further anaIysed regarding the CNIL decision. They are, how-
ever, helpful for an understanding of Article 6 of the EC
Directive on Data Protection. The second condition concems
the purpose for the interference in the privacy. The interfer-
ence should be necessary for the interests of national securi-
ty, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms
of others. There is again a broad margin of interpretation for
thOse criteria. The last condition requires that the measure be
necessary in a democratic sodety. As to the question of
whether a restriction to privacy is necessary, "the national
authorities are alIowed a very broad "margin of apprecia-
tion".61 The Convention does not seem particuiarly helpful
since the criteria used are really wide as weil. It seems finalIy
that the Court in judging a case will determine whether the
interference at issue is proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued and whether the reasons adduced to justify it are
"relevant and sufficient".62
With regard to the choice between the different projects,
the criteria of proportionality requires that as between the
measures foreseen for accomplishing the purpose of having
an automatic tol1ing system for security reasons and for avoid-
ing trdffic congestion, the least harmful challenge to privacy
must be chosen. Therefore, one bas to ask the question which
of the projects best satisfies this principle, assuming that one
is flOt confronted with the problem of obtaining the data sub-
ject's consent. A quick overview suggests the following:
The best level of compliance with the privacy and data
protection issues can be found in projects that need less par-
ticipants for forming the association which comprise the con-
troller. It seems indeed somewhat dangerous to multiply the
number of persons or entities that may have access to data
3. Collect data that must be adequate, relevant and
not excessive
According to Article 6c of the Directive, the personal data
must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to
the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed. This Article refers to the concept of data compli-
ance. A legitimate and specified purpose does not in itself
authorize use of any data. For cach purpose specified, a suffi-
cient connection must be established beyond doubt between
the purpose and the data collected. Any irrelevant data must
be discarded.66 Suffi an Article does flot in itself create a
problem. Simply, one can remark that the operator should
only be authorized to collect data in line with the purpose of
allowing a good recovery of the road fees at the tolling place
and no more. Therefore, the following potential secondary
use of data must be strictly forbidden:
.data regarding the speed of the drivers;
.the drivers' habit of driving and the inmction regarding
the Highway code;
.where you live and when you are coming home;
.at what time you are going to work or go shopping;
.your place of worship and how often you go there;
.where your children go to school;
.where your friends live.
An exception to the interdiction of secondary use could
be foreseen for data used for statistical purposes.67 Suffi use
of the data should flot necessarily be striCtly forbidden pro-
vided that the subject cannot be identified. ln other words,
the data should be rendered entireiy anonymous.
Some public authorities may, however, be tempted to use
personal data for the purpose of repressing fraud.1n that case
the question whether or flOt, an exception to Article 6, which
should be foreseen in Cavour of prosecutors and jurisdictional
authorities may corne to light.68 Article 14 of the
Telecommunication Directive69 allows suffi derogation for
the purpose of preventing and detecting criminal offences.


















some individuals may wish to apply for such an exception.
Wollid it be advisable? It is not up to us to decide. Let us just
remark that it seems dangerous. As the CNIL did, one wollid
Iike to insist on the limited role of the operators and specify
that they are not in charge of any poficy development.
Therefore, they shollid not participate, even indirectly,
towards other activities regarding so many important data. ln
addition, this collid lead to the development of a super-State
that could at any moment, define an interest justifying the
right to know all of our movements. If, in spite of this, such
derogation was adopted, we think that it wollid at least not
lead to a change in the conservation principle laid down in
the following section. lndeed, if that was the case, it wollid
become impossible to fix a limited period of conservation of
the data for the operators.
performance at work, credit worthiness, reliability, conduct or
anything else.
This negative obligation would seem to require opera-
tors, controlling a database of bad payers, flot to preclude a
driver from using the autoRoad even if that individual never
pays.
However, for the efficient operation of the automatic sys-
tem, it would seem advisable for Member States to lay down
legai measures (on the basis of Article 15.2b) authorizing
operators to forbid a driver from using a motorway if the
computer system bas identified that person as a recutrent
non- payer. The data subject's legitimate interest could be safe-
güarded by, for example, a warning sent by registered post,
prior to the decision threatening prohibition of the use of the
motorway. The data subject should have at least a 15 days to







THE DATA SUBJECTS' RIGHTS
According to article 10 of the Directive, the data subject bas
the right to obtain a series of information when data relating
to himself are collected. Moreover, Article 12 recognizes a
right of access (designed to promote the accuracy of the data
while ensuring that it is kept up to date) and a right of rectifi-
cation. Those rights seem precious particulariy regarding the
fact that some data collected may be wrong since the associa-
tion between the driver and the owner of the registration
plate are not always the same. However in practice they
appear quite theoretical. The difficulty in giving suffi informa-
tion to the user ha.'i already been explained. There is also the
problem of giving the data subject an effective right of access
since the data are collected in ail European countries. The
temptation will be strong to have recourse to the exception
provided by Article 13. According to this Article, Member
States may adopt legts/attve measures to restrict the scope of
such rights when such a measure constitutes a necessary safe-
guard, e.g. for the purposes of national security, defence, pub-
lic security, the prosecution of criminal offence, important
economic and financial interests, officiai authority or protec-
tion of data subjects. Such exception reminds one of the
exception confirmed in Article 8 of the Convention. ln the
present case any legislative action would probably be based

















4. Conserve data during a limited period
Data must also flot be kept longer than is necessary for the
purpose for which the data were collected or for which they
are further processed.70 ln specie, the purpose of most data
collected (flash of the registl-ation plate, time of the crossing,
and kilometres travelIed) is to make sure that a payment has
been made and to keep a proof of the payment in case of dis-
pute.
The duration of conservation may depend on the project
chosen. It seems a priori easier for projects like those using
deferred payment or those using smart cards (non-reloaded)
to determine the period during which the data may be con-
served.According to the conservation principle, for deferred
payment, the data should only be conserved for a period of,
for example, 10 days following the reception of the bill
except in case of dispute.
Regarding deferred payment, the driver may be interested
in receiving itemized bills in order to verify the correctness of
the fees charged by the operators in respect of the kilome-
tres travelled. However, as it has been pointed out in the
Directive concerning the processing of persona! data and the
protection of privacy in the telecommunication sector,71 it
may jeopardise the privacy. Therefore, it may be recommend-
ed to Member States, as the telecommunication Directive did,






The airn of this article bas been to analyse in relation to some
EU projects, how an automatic tolling system might be used
in conformity with the Directive on the protection of individ.
uaIs with regard to the processing of persona! data and on the
free movement of sure data and whether or not suffi
Directive offers sufficient protection for the individual.
It staned with the submission that each automatic tolling
system will have to answer to common technical features.
Among those features, the use of the flash of the registration
plate appears particular1y important not only in relation to
securing payment and pursuing fraud but also in confirming
to the driver that the correct SUffi bas been paid.
The analysis leads to the conclusion that legïslation com-
mon to aIl European Member States is desirable. ln assuming
5. Fair and lawful processing
Article 6 1 (a) requires that personal data must be processed
fairly and lawfu1ly. This means that the processing must be
made in accordance with the legislation and in confomlity to
the transparency principle. The data subject must therefore
be cleariy aware of the uses of data relating to him, either
when the data is collected, recorded or flrst disclosed.
According to Article 22 and following, the violation of
such articles is sanctioned by the provisions of nationallaw.
6. No automated decision
Article 15 of the Directive provides that individuals have a
right not to be subject to a decision whicb produces legal
effects for them or significantly affects them and whicb is
based solely on automated processing of data intended to
evaluate certain persona! aspects relating to them, sucb as
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responsibility for proposing recommendations as to the
content of the Directive that could be adopted, the follow-
ing necessities corne to mind: (i) the possibility of different
payment methods; (ü) the need to determine by what con-
ditions a flash of the registration plate might be authorized
by fIXing a clear and sufficient purpose for processing
accompanied by wananties; (ili) the establishment of mini-
mum of requirements for standards of security regarding the
quality and appropriate use of the instrUment used to col-
lect the data and to stock il; (iv) identifying the person
jointIf to be considered as Controller and the purpose of
the data collection. The Directive should also apply to legal
entities and offer protection to the employees; (v) all sec-
ondary use of the data and aIl modification of such purpose
should be clearly forbidden; (vi) the period of the data con-
servation should also be fixed; (vii) a general right of access
and use of the data by public authorities (mainly prosecu-
tors) should be forbidden; (viii) an automated decision
should be permined but must be accompanied by safeguard
measures. It seems that this is the price to be paid to protect
the privacy of individuaIs and avoid the birth of Big
Brotber.
Jean-François Lerouge, assistant and Researcher,
Research Centre for Computers and Law, Facultés
Universitaires, Notre-Dame de la Paix de Namur, Belgium
FOOTNOTES
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